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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this mortgage loan discrimination case, a putative 
class of minority borrowers seeks permission under Rule 
23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to appeal the 
denial of final approval by the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of the parties’ proposed 
settlement and certification of the settlement class.  We will 
grant the petition for permission to appeal and, for the reasons 
that follow, will affirm the order of the District Court.     
 
I. Background 
 
 Named plaintiffs John Rodriguez, Jennifer 
Worthington, Bobby Crouther, Jesus Conchas, and Rosa 
Maria Conchas (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are African-
American and Hispanic borrowers who obtained mortgage 
loans from Defendant National City Bank in 2006 or 2007.  
On May 1, 2008, they filed a class action complaint against 
National City Bank and its parent company, National City 
Corporation (collectively, “National City”),1
                                              
1 On October 24, 2008, The PNC Financial Services 
Group, Inc. (“PNC”), acquired National City, and Plaintiffs 
subsequently filed a second amended complaint that added 
PNC as a defendant, as successor-in-interest to National City.   
 alleging that 
National City had an established pattern or practice of racial 
discrimination in the financing of residential home purchases, 
in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3605, and 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691.  
Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that National City issued them 
loans pursuant to a “Discretionary Pricing Policy” that 
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allowed individual brokers and loan officers to add a 
subjective surcharge of additional points, fees, and credit 
costs to an otherwise objective, risk-based financing rate.  
According to Plaintiffs, as a result of that policy, minority 
applicants for home mortgage loans were “charged a 
disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-related charges 
than similarly-situated Caucasian persons.”  (J.A. at 117.)  In 
other words, the policy allegedly produced a discriminatory 
disparate impact.   
 
 After the District Court denied National City’s motion 
to dismiss,2
                                              
2 More precisely, the District Court granted National 
City’s motion to strike from the complaint certain paragraphs 
that would have “require[d] Defendants to undertake 
substantial investigation before filing a responsive pleading” 
(J.A. at 149), but denied the motion “to the extent that it 
[sought] to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint in whole or 
in part” (id. at 150).   
 the parties engaged in extensive discovery.  
National City provided Plaintiffs with data on each of the 
more than two million loans it issued from 2001 to 2008.  
That data included, among other things, the annual percentage 
rate, the term of the loan, the interest rate, the prepayment 
terms, the origination fee, and the amortization type, as well 
as information about the borrower, including income, 
ethnicity, race, and debt-to-income ratio.  While discovery 
was still proceeding, the parties met to explore the possibility 
of a negotiated settlement.  Plaintiffs presented National City 
with preliminary statistical analyses of the loan data they had 
received.  Although those analyses were shared confidentially 
and are thus not in the record, the parties agree that they 
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included regression analyses of National City’s loan data.3
 
  
Plaintiffs say that those regression analyses revealed that, 
overall, “Blacks and Hispanics paid more for their loans than 
similarly situated Caucasians (a ‘disparate impact’) that 
amounted to damages … of at least $350 and up to $1,100 per 
loan.”  (Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 5.)  Plaintiffs further 
contend that, because they controlled for “all objective credit 
and risk factors impacting loan pricing” (Id. at 12), those 
analyses prove that National City’s Discretionary Pricing 
Policy produced the disparate impact.    
 After participating in two days of mediation, the 
parties arrived at a proposed settlement agreement.  Under its 
terms, the class would include “[a]ll African-American and 
Hispanic persons who obtained a Mortgage Loan” from 
National City, its affiliates, or its successor-in-interest, PNC, 
from January 1, 2004, through the date of the settlement’s 
preliminary approval.  (J.A. at 250.)  National City did not 
concede any wrongdoing, but it agreed to pay $7,000,000 for 
the benefit of the settlement class in exchange for a release of 
claims.  Specifically, the agreement provided a service award 
of $7,500 to each of the named plaintiffs, $200 to each class 
payee, $75,000 to two organizations that would provide 
counseling and other services to the settlement class, and 
$2,100,000 in attorneys’ fees.  The agreement also included a 
provision barring either party from attempting to void the 
agreement, except in the event of an appeal.     
 
                                              
3 Plaintiffs describe a regression analysis as “a 
statistical tool which determines the relationship between a 
variable to be studied and one or more potentially explanatory 
variables.”  (Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 4 n.3.)   
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 On July 21, 2010, the District Court granted 
preliminary approval of the settlement and preliminarily 
certified the proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3).  Notice was then sent to the more than 
153,000 members of the putative class.  In response to that 
notice, six people objected to the proposed agreement, 66 
opted out of the settlement, and 24,631 sought to take part in 
it by submitting claim forms.  On December 9, 2010, 
Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion requesting final approval 
of the settlement agreement, final certification of the 
settlement class, and attorneys’ fees.  In January 2011, after 
holding an initial fairness hearing, the District Court ordered 
additional briefing regarding certain aspects of the settlement 
agreement.  Before the Court reached a final determination in 
light of that briefing, the Supreme Court issued its now well-
known opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011).  The District Court ordered another round of 
supplemental briefing, this time asking the parties to discuss 
the impact of Dukes on class certification.  In that briefing, 
both parties continued to support class certification, as they 
had promised in their settlement agreement.     
 
 The District Court, however, read Dukes as preventing 
certification, and, on September 8, 2011, it issued an order to 
that effect, denying at the same time Plaintiffs’ motion for 
final settlement approval.  In its memorandum opinion, the 
Court held that the settlement class failed to meet Rule 
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23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements.4
                                              
4 As more fully described herein, infra Part III.B, 
“commonality” demands that the members of a prospective 
class share at least one question of fact or law common to 
their claims.  Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 
1994).  The “typicality” requirement instructs courts “to 
assess whether the class representatives themselves present 
[the] common issues of law and fact that justify class 
treatment … .”  Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  As the District Court rightly noted, see 
Rodriguez, 277 F.R.D. at 154 n.5, we have said that the 
commonality and typicality requirements “tend to merge,” 
such that if commonality is not satisfied, typicality is likely 
not satisfied for the same reason.  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 
418 F.3d 277, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Baby Neal, 43 F.3d 
at 56) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
  It 
explained that Dukes had clarified the standard for 
establishing commonality, and that, under that standard, 
“Plaintiffs would likely have to show the disparate impact and 
analysis for each loan officer or at a minimum each group of 
loan officers working for a specific supervisor” in order to 
demonstrate commonality.  Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 277 
F.R.D. 148, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  The regression analyses’ 
demonstration of an overall race-based disparity was 
inadequate, the Court said, because, even if the analyses 
“remove[d] all credit related reasoning, there may be non-
credit related reasoning that individual loan officers 
contemplated that is not based on race.”  Id.  Accordingly, the 
Court decided that Plaintiffs had “fail[ed] to show that the 
class could be certified,” and it denied their motion.  Id.  This 
timely appeal followed. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  The matter is before us on Plaintiffs’ petition for 
leave to appeal, filed in accordance with Rule 23(f) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows us to “permit 
an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 
certification … if a petition for permission to appeal is filed 
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is 
entered.”     
 
 We have “very broad discretion in deciding whether to 
grant permission to pursue a Rule 23(f) appeal.”  Gutierrez v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (“Appeal 
from an order granting or denying class certification is 
permitted in the sole discretion of the court of appeals.”).  In 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001), we identified several circumstances 
in which appellate review is appropriate, including: (1) “when 
denial of certification effectively terminates the litigation 
because the value of each plaintiff’s claim is outweighed by 
the costs of stand-alone litigation”; (2) when class 
certification risks placing “inordinate … pressure on 
defendants to settle”; (3) “when an appeal implicates novel or 
unsettled questions of law”; (4) when the district court’s class 
certification determination was erroneous; and (5) when the 
appeal might “facilitate development of the law on class 
certification.”  Id. at 164-65.  By contrast, review is 
discouraged when the natural course of litigation will provide 
the moving party with an adequate remedy, or when the 
certification decision was routine and easily resolved.  Id.   
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 Permitting this appeal facilitates the development of 
the law on class certification by allowing us to consider the 
nature of the commonality inquiry in light of the Supreme 
Court’s important instruction in Dukes.  We therefore will 
grant Plaintiffs’ petition and exercise our jurisdiction pursuant 
to Rule 23(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).     
 
 We review a district court’s decision to approve or 
reject a class action settlement agreement for abuse of 
discretion.  Newton, 259 F.3d at 165; see also In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“The trial court, well-positioned to decide which facts and 
legal arguments are most important to each Rule 23 
requirement, possesses broad discretion to control 
proceedings and frame issues for consideration under Rule 
23.”)  A district court abuses its discretion if its decision 
“rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Whether an 
incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be 
reviewed de novo.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
 Plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion in two ways: it contravened the “limited role” a 
court should occupy when deciding whether to certify a 
settlement class, and it based its commonality determination 
on an erroneous application of Dukes.  National City, now 
free under the terms of the settlement agreement to object to 
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class certification,5
 
 contends that the Court occupied its 
prescribed role and reached the correct result under Dukes.  
We address those competing arguments in turn and conclude 
that the scope of the District Court’s inquiry was fully 
consistent with Dukes, as well as with our own precedent and 
Rule 23, and that the Court rightly concluded that the putative 
class lacks commonality.       
 A. Certification of a Settlement Class 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires that the 
members of a proposed class share a common question of law 
or fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).  That commonality 
requirement is, along with numerosity, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation, one of Rule 23(a)’s four 
“threshold requirements” for class certification, Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997), which are 
intended to “limit the class claims to those fairly 
encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims,” Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2550 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 156 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).6
                                              
5 The settlement agreement provides that, “[i]n the 
event any court disapproves or sets aside this Settlement 
Agreement” and the “Parties do not agree jointly to appeal 
such ruling,” the parties are released from their obligations 
under the agreement.  (J.A. at 265.) 
  
6 Specifically, Rule 23(a) provides that: 
[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
members only if: 
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Although they apply to all putative classes, those 
requirements are of “vital importance” in the settlement 
context because they protect absent class members “by 
blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions.”  
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.  For that reason, the Supreme 
Court held in Amchem that, although certain Rule 23 
considerations, such as “whether the case, if tried, would 
present intractable management problems,” are not applicable 
in the settlement class context, the Rule’s other requirements 
“demand undiluted, even heightened, attention” when class 
action representatives are seeking certification for the purpose 
of settlement.  Id. at 620.  Thus, in addition to determining 
whether a proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), district courts must ensure 
that each of Rule 23(a)’s requirements, including 
commonality, is satisfied before certifying a class and 
                                                                                                     
 (1) the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class; 
 (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; and 
 (4) the representative parties will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
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approving a class settlement agreement.7
 
  See Sullivan v. DB 
Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 296 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“[B]efore approving a class settlement agreement, a district 
court first must determine that the requirements for class 
certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 
F.3d 277, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[R]egardless of whether a 
district court certifies a class for trial or for settlement, it must 
first find that the class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 
23.”).  
 Plaintiffs agree that the requirements of Rule 23(a) 
remain intact in the settlement context, but they maintain that, 
“when a settlement class … is presented for consideration,” 
those requirements “operate in tandem with a strong 
presumption in favor of voluntary settlement agreements.”  
(Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 25-26.)  They say the District 
                                              
7 Parties seeking certification must also show that “the 
action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).”  In re 
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Plaintiffs here brought their case under both Rule 
23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), and the District Court 
preliminarily certified the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  
Rule 23(b)(3) imposes two additional requirements: (1) 
common questions must “predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members” and (2) class resolution 
must be “superior to other available methods for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3).  Because of its Rule 23(a) determination, the 
District Court in its final review of the proposed settlement 
did not reach the issue of whether those Rule 23(b) 
requirements were satisfied.  
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Court disregarded that presumption and “undermin[ed] the 
well-established policy interest in promoting settlements” (id. 
at 28), by “delving into the merits of Class Members’ claims” 
(id. at 24) and “speculat[ing] regarding evidence not on the 
record” (id. at 28).  They argue that the Court should have 
occupied a more “limited” role in conducting its Rule 23 
inquiry – one that respected the bargain the parties had struck 
in reaching a negotiated settlement.      
 
 Laying particular emphasis on Sullivan v. DB 
Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), and 
Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2010), 
Plaintiffs correctly assert that we have, on several occasions, 
articulated a policy preference favoring voluntary settlement 
in class actions.  Sullivan instructed that assessing whether 
individual class members have viable claims is inappropriate 
in the context of reviewing a proposed settlement class 
because such an inquiry would “seriously undermine” our 
strong preference for settlement agreements.  667 F.3d at 311; 
see id. at 305 (explaining that “[a]n analysis into the legal 
viability of asserted claims is properly considered through a 
motion to dismiss … or summary judgment … , not as part of 
a Rule 23 certification process”).  In Ehrheart, we refused to 
vacate a settlement despite an intervening change in the law 
that eliminated the plaintiffs’ underlying cause of action.  609 
F.3d at 595-96.  We concluded that the settlement agreement 
was a binding contract, and that permitting a party to “back 
out of an agreement at any time before court approval” would 
render the settlement process “meaningless.”  Id. at 594.  
Thus, we held the parties to their bargain, upholding our 
“strong judicial policy in favor of class action settlement.”  
Id. at 595. 
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   But while that policy is indeed strong, it cannot alter 
the strictures of Rule 23.  The Supreme Court explained in 
Amchem that courts must be “mindful that the Rule as now 
composed sets the requirements they are bound to enforce,” 
as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be amended only 
through the “extensive deliberative process” Congress 
prescribed.  521 U.S. at 620.  Rule 23 has been amended to 
provide for settlement classes, but solely to add the additional 
hurdle of Rule 23(e), which mandates that the reviewing court 
find the settlement to be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  That amendment “was designed to 
function as an additional requirement, not a superseding 
direction” respecting the class-qualifying criteria of Rule 
23(a) and (b).  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.  The “dominant 
concern” of Rule 23 – that “a proposed class has sufficient 
unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions 
of class representatives” – “persists when settlement, rather 
than trial, is proposed.”  Id.   Therefore, whether class action 
representatives are seeking certification for the purpose of 
settlement or with the intent to litigate, the members of the 
proposed class must meet the threshold requirements of Rule 
23(a), and our policy preference for voluntary settlement 
cannot and does not alter that demand.   
 
 In Sullivan and Ehrheart, we recognized the constant 
applicability of Rule 23.  We said in Sullivan that, although 
settlement is clearly favored, “global settlements may 
nevertheless be rejected for failing to meet the requirements 
of Rule 23.”  667 F.3d at 311 n.40.  In Ehrheart too we 
acknowledged that district courts have a responsibility to 
review settlements, and we reversed the district court not for 
any Rule 23 determination but for granting judgment on the 
pleadings after the parties had entered into a binding contract.  
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609 F.3d at 593 (describing the district court’s role and 
explaining that the court in that case “never considered 
whether to approve the settlement”).  In neither case did we 
excuse a failure to establish commonality, nor did we bar the 
district court from exercising its independent judgment in 
deciding whether the Rule 23 requirements were met.  See In 
re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 301 (requiring that a 
district court “exercise[] independent judgment” in the Rule 
23 determination). 
 
Furthermore, neither case lessened the burden required 
to demonstrate that putative class members share a common 
question of law or fact.  As we have repeatedly stated, the 
Rule 23(a) requirements are “not mere pleading rules.”  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 316) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, 
at the threshold, “[t]he party seeking certification bears the 
burden of establishing each element of Rule 23 by a 
preponderance of the evidence,” which requires 
demonstrating “actual, not presumed, conformance” with the 
Rule.  Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The district court “must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ of the 
evidence and arguments put forth,” id. (quoting In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316), a task that sometimes 
involves “a preliminary inquiry into the merits” of the 
plaintiffs’ claims to ensure they can be “properly resolved as 
a class action,” Newton, 259 F.3d at 168; see also Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. at 2551 (“Frequently that rigorous analysis will entail 
some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying 
claim.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 
 Relying on Sullivan, Plaintiffs imply that a “rigorous 
analysis” is inappropriate in the context of a class action 
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settlement.  They note that Sullivan instructed courts not to 
delve into the underlying merits to determine if individual 
claims are viable.  See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 306 (“[T]he 
merits inquiry is particularly unwarranted in the settlement 
context … .”).  Ehrheart made similar statements, 
emphasizing the “restricted, tightly focused role that Rule 23 
prescribes for district courts,” 609 F.3d at 593, and holding 
that the district court abused its discretion by rescinding the 
parties’ settlement agreement due to a change in the law that 
made plaintiffs’ claims nonviable, id. at 595-96.  But while 
both decisions advised courts not to assess whether plaintiffs’ 
claims would be capable of succeeding if the case were to go 
to trial, neither limited the ability of district courts to consider 
the merits of a case when necessary for a Rule 23 
determination.  In fact, Sullivan specifically explained that 
“an examination of the elements of plaintiffs’ claim is 
sometimes necessary, not in order to determine whether each 
class member states a valid claim, but instead to determine 
whether the requirements of Rule 23 … are met.”  667 F.3d at 
306.  Put more simply, our policy in favor of voluntary 
settlement does not alter the “rigorous analysis” needed to 
ensure that the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied.  Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. at 2551; see also Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 335 (“The 
same analytical rigor is required for litigation and settlement 
certification … .”) (Scirica, J., concurring).         
 
   Plaintiffs’ other arguments regarding the proper role of 
the district court in settlement certification are similarly 
unavailing.  They take particular issue with the District 
Court’s alleged “conjecture” regarding evidence not in the 
record.  (Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 34.)  Noting that “the 
parties in this case agreed to a settlement before the record 
was as developed as it would have been in a fully contested 
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motion on class certification” (id. at 29), they argue that the 
District Court should not have “quibble[d] with and 
concentrate[d] on the quantity of evidence at settlement” 
because “[s]uch considerations do not apply in a settlement 
class” (id. at 30).  They contend that by “speculat[ing]” about 
nondiscriminatory explanations for individual loan officers’ 
decisions (id. at 28), the District Court improperly elevated 
the evidentiary showing needed for certification of a 
settlement class.   
 
That argument misunderstands the burden of proof 
required for class certification.  It is not enough that the 
parties agreed to settle and believed that “a more fully 
developed record would show that there were questions of 
law and fact common to all Class Members.”  (Id. at 29-30.)  
One cannot say, in effect, “we could show commonality, if 
we had to.”  The short answer is, “you do have to.”  See 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (holding that the party seeking class 
certification must demonstrate the putative class’s 
conformance with Rule 23).  That burden is not onerous.  It 
does, however, require an affirmative showing that the class 
members share a common question of law or fact.  Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 306.  The mere possibility that evidence of 
commonality could have been produced does not satisfy that 
burden.  Therefore, the District Court did not err by requiring 
actual evidence that the putative class satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 23(a).           
 
 Plaintiffs further contend that the District Court erred 
by “fail[ing] to fulfill its fiduciary role” to protect the 
interests of the unnamed members of the class.  (Petitioners’ 
Opening Br. at 26.)  They argue that that role defines the 
scope of a district court’s responsibilities in certifying a 
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settlement class, and they imply that the District Court here 
acted beyond the scope of those responsibilities by denying 
class certification.  Both contentions are incorrect.  Although 
we have indeed highlighted the district court’s role as a 
protector of absent members of the plaintiff class, see 
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 319 (“[A] district court acts as a 
fiduciary for absent class members[.]” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), our emphasis on that role has never been 
meant as a substitute for the requirements of Rule 23.  Rule 
23(a) explicitly requires that a putative class possess 
commonality, and courts are bound to enforce that 
requirement regardless of whether it benefits plaintiffs or 
defendants.  In any event, there is no indication that the 
District Court’s decision to decertify the class here failed to 
protect the interests of absent class members.  When a class 
of plaintiffs does not share a common question of law or fact, 
it may well include individuals who did not actually 
experience the harm allegedly caused by the defendants.  If 
that class is certified, those individuals will nonetheless 
partake in the recovery, which diminishes the relief for class 
members who actually were harmed.  The Supreme Court 
stated in Amchem that the Rule 23(a) requirements are of 
“vital importance” in the settlement context precisely because 
they are “designed to protect absentees by blocking 
unwarranted or overbroad class definitions.”  521 U.S. at 620 
(emphasis added).  Thus, denial of certification to a class that 
lacks commonality falls squarely within the district court’s 
prescribed role in considering the propriety of a settlement 
class.   
 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the parties entered into 
their agreement knowing that Dukes might alter the legal 
landscape, and the District Court should have respected their 
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decision “to settle and achieve certainty” rather than gamble 
on what the Supreme Court would decide.  (Petitioners’ 
Opening Br. at 33.)  They again cite Ehrheart and Sullivan, 
this time for the proposition that the “choice to settle 
implicitly acknowledges calculated risks and, in the end, 
reflects deliberate decisions of both parties to opt for certainty 
in terminating their litigation.”  (Id. (quoting Ehrheart, 609 
F.3d at 594) (internal quotation marks omitted).)  See also 
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 312 (“[A] district court’s certification of 
a settlement simply recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision 
to bind themselves according to mutually agreed-upon terms 
… .”).  According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he District Court’s 
decision does … injustice to the Parties’ bargain” by 
“render[ing] [the] settlement void, seemingly because the 
Parties had agreed to put a halt to this litigation before class, 
expert, factual and merits issues were fully litigated, an 
eventuality that the Parties consciously chose to avoid … .”8
                                              
8 To the extent that Plaintiffs are arguing that the 
District Court was wrong to even consider Dukes in its Rule 
23 review because it is a “change[] in the law after 
settlement,” see Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 595, that argument 
lacks merit.  Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes 
is an intervening and pointedly clear explication of the law, it 
did not announce any change in the test for determining 
commonality.  It relied on existing precedent to emphasize 
the necessity of meeting the commonality standard under 
Rule 23(a).  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57; id. at 2554 
(applying existing precedent to reach its conclusion).  That 
standard – both before and after Dukes – requires that a 
putative class of plaintiffs share a common question of law or 
fact.  Compare Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56 (“The commonality 
  
(Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 35-36.) 
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Yet again, that argument fails because, as much as they 
might like to, parties cannot choose to avoid the judicial 
scrutiny demanded by Rule 23.  Before approving the 
settlement of a class action, a district court must certify that 
the settlement comports with Rule 23 and is “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).  Nothing less will 
suffice.  It is true that we have advised courts not to “intrude 
upon the parties’ bargain” after a settlement agreement is 
reached, Ehrheart, 609 F.3d at 593, but a denial of class 
certification does not constitute such an intrusion, as it is the 
result of a required inquiry that both parties had to have 
contemplated from the outset of their agreement.  The parties 
in this case may well have considered in their bargaining that 
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Dukes, but that 
consideration does not insulate them from the District Court’s 
responsibilities under Rule 23.           
 
 At base, Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the proper role 
of the District Court seems to be that the Court was required 
                                                                                                     
requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at 
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class.”), with Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 297 (“[A] 
proposed class must share a common question of law or fact 
… .”).  Indeed, Dukes specifically stated that “for purposes of 
Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common question will do,” 131 S. 
Ct. at 2556 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), making clear that it did not alter the standard for 
assessing commonality.  Ehrheart’s admonition that “changes 
in the law after settlement … do not provide a legitimate basis 
for rescinding [a] settlement,” 609 F.3d at 595, therefore has 
no bearing on this case.         
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to conduct its commonality review in a manner that did not 
upset the parties’ settlement agreement.  Such a review, 
though, is no review at all.  The Rule 23 inquiry is certainly 
not meant to discourage settlement, but it is more than a 
rubber stamp, and thus it will sometimes result in the undoing 
of a settlement.  The fact that it did so in this instance is 
therefore not in itself a basis for reversing the denial of class 
certification.  The District Court stayed fully within its 
prescribed role and conducted the inquiry required of it by 
our precedent, by the Supreme Court, and by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
 B. The Commonality Determination 
 
Because we conclude that the District Court properly 
fulfilled its prescribed role in conducting a Rule 23 review, 
we turn to the question of whether the Court rightly 
concluded that commonality is lacking in the class proposed 
in this case.  A putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s 
commonality requirement if “the named plaintiffs share at 
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class.”  Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Again, that bar is not a high one.  We have 
acknowledged commonality to be present even when not all 
plaintiffs suffered an actual injury, id., when plaintiffs did not 
bring identical claims, In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311, and, 
most dramatically, when some plaintiffs’ claims may not have 
been legally viable, Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 305-07.  In reaching 
those conclusions, we explained that the focus of the 
commonality inquiry is not on the strength of each plaintiff’s 
claim, but instead is “on whether the defendant’s conduct was 
common as to all of the class members.”  Id. at 299; see also 
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d 
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Cir. 2004) (focusing the commonality inquiry on the 
defendant’s conduct, not “on the conduct of individual class 
members”); Newton, 259 F.3d at 183 (identifying common 
questions regarding the defendant’s conduct); Baby Neal, 43 
F.3d at 57 (considering whether the defendant “engag[ed] in a 
common course of conduct toward” the class members).  In 
other words, there may be many legal and factual differences 
among the members of a class, as long as all were subjected 
to the same harmful conduct by the defendant.  Baby Neal, 43 
F.3d at 56. 
 
 In Dukes, the Supreme Court explained how the 
commonality standard applies when the complained-of 
conduct is a discretionary corporate policy that allegedly has 
a discriminatory effect.  The putative class in that case 
consisted of “all women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic 
retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, who have 
been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged pay and 
management track promotions policies and practices.”  131 S. 
Ct. at 2549 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  
That enormous class of about 1.5 million women alleged that 
Wal-Mart’s policy “allowing discretion by local supervisors 
over employment matters” produced a disparate 
discriminatory impact, evidenced by a statistical analysis of 
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the company’s employment information.9  Id. at 2547, 2554 
(emphasis omitted).  The Supreme Court concluded that that 
evidence was insufficient to establish commonality.  While 
acknowledging that “giving discretion to lower-level 
supervisors can,” in some circumstances, “be the basis of 
Title VII liability under a disparate impact theory,” id. at 
2554, the Court quoted Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 
487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988), to emphasize that such claims must 
do more than “merely prov[e] that the discretionary system 
has produced a racial or sexual disparity” – they must also 
identify “the specific employment practice that is 
challenged,” id. at 2555 (internal quotation marks omitted).10
                                              
9 The plaintiffs in Dukes also brought a disparate 
treatment claim, which alleged that Wal-Mart had a corporate 
culture of bias against women.  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.  
They attempted to demonstrate that culture of bias through a 
sociologist’s analysis, affidavits recounting individual 
plaintiffs’ experiences, and a regression analysis purporting to 
show gender-based disparities that “can be explained only by 
gender discrimination.”  Id. at 2555 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Plaintiffs here bring only a disparate impact claim, 
and they do not allege any intentional discrimination or 
“culture of bias” on the part of National City.  (See 
Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 50 (“[T]his is a disparate impact 
case and not a disparate treatment case … .”).)   
  
10 The plaintiffs in Dukes failed to do that, the 
Supreme Court said, because “Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of 
allowing discretion by local supervisors …. is just the 
opposite of a uniform employment practice that would 
provide the commonality needed for a class action.” Id. at 
2554.  
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Moreover, to bring a case as a class action, the named 
plaintiffs must show that each class member was subjected to 
the specific challenged practice in roughly the same manner.  
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555-56.  The Dukes plaintiffs were all 
subjected to the discretion of their supervisors, but they had 
not demonstrated “a common mode of exercising discretion 
that pervades the entire company,” id. at 2554-55, such that 
the policy could be considered a “uniform employment 
practice” that all members of the putative class had 
experienced, id. at 2554.  Rather, the Dukes plaintiffs 
encountered different managers making different types of 
employment decisions for different reasons, many of them 
likely nondiscriminatory in nature.  They therefore had not 
been subjected to a common harm, and the proposed class 
lacked commonality.  Id. at 2555. 
 
 This case bears a striking resemblance to Dukes.  Here, 
the class proposed by the Plaintiffs consists of “[a]ll African-
American and Hispanic persons who obtained a Mortgage 
Loan” from National City between January 1, 2004 and the 
date the class was preliminarily certified.  (J.A. at 250.)  On 
behalf of those 153,000 class members, the named plaintiffs 
allege that National City’s “Discretionary Pricing Policy” had 
the effect of charging African-American and Hispanic 
borrowers “a disproportionately greater amount in non-risk-
related charges than similarly-situated Caucasian persons.”  
(J.A. at 102, 117.)  More specifically, Plaintiffs argue that 
National City granted brokers and loan officers the discretion 
to increase or decrease loan prices after an objective 
determination of loan eligibility, which discretion produced 
an overall disparate discriminatory impact.  Therefore, in 
order to demonstrate that they have suffered a common harm, 
the putative class here must show that National City’s grant 
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of discretion to individual loan officers constitutes a “specific 
practice” that affected all the class members in the same 
general fashion.  In other words, Plaintiffs must identify some 
“common mode” in which those brokers exercised their 
discretion.  131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 
  Plaintiffs claim they have done so.  They conducted 
regression analyses of National City’s loan data, which they 
say demonstrate the Discretionary Pricing Policy’s disparate 
impact even after controlling for legitimate factors affecting 
the price of loans.11
 
  From what Plaintiffs characterize as “the 
objective nature of a loan pricing decision,” they argue that, 
by “eliminat[ing] all objective credit and risk factors 
impacting loan pricing,” they have shown that the only 
function the discretionary policy served was to produce a 
discriminatory effect.  (Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 12.)  
Therefore, they say, the regression analyses show that the 
loan officers’ “common mode of exercising discretion,” 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554, was discriminatory.        
 But that conclusion is simply unsupported by the 
evidence.  Even if Plaintiffs had succeeded in controlling for 
every objective credit-related variable – something no court 
could have reviewed because the analyses are not of record – 
the regression analyses do not even purport to control for 
individual, subjective considerations.  A loan officer may 
have set an individual borrower’s interest rate and fees based 
on any number of non-discriminatory reasons, such as 
whether the mortgage loans were intended to benefit other 
                                              
11 Notably, those analyses were not included in the 
record before the District Court, although they were presented 
to National City during settlement negotiations.     
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family members who were not borrowers, whether borrowers 
misrepresented their income or assets, whether borrowers 
were seeking or had previously been given  favorable loan-to-
value terms not warranted by their credit status, whether the 
loans were part of a beneficial debt consolidation, or even 
concerns the loan officer may have had at the time for the 
financial institution irrespective of the borrower.12
 
  While 
those possibilities do not necessarily rebut the argument that 
the Discretionary Pricing Policy opened the door to biases 
that individual loan officers could have harbored, they do 
undermine the assertion that there was a common and 
unlawful mode by which the officers exercised their 
discretion.   
 Even assuming, however, that Plaintiffs had succeeded 
in identifying a specific employment policy that could be 
sufficiently distinguished from the discretionary policy in 
Dukes, they still have not shown that it affected all class 
                                              
12 Plaintiffs argue that contemplating such subjective-
yet-not-discriminatory reasons for individual loan pricing 
decisions involves impermissible “speculation and 
conjecture.”  (Petitioners’ Opening Br. at 2.)  Far more 
speculative, we believe, are the Plaintiffs’ unsupported 
presumptions that a loan pricing determination is a purely 
objective matter and that an average racial disparity indicates 
that each minority borrower experienced National City’s 
policy in a discriminatory way.  More to the point, though, 
the burden is on the Plaintiffs to establish the threshold Rule 
23(a) requirements.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591; see also supra, 
Section III.A.  If the District Court engaged in speculation, it 
is because the Plaintiffs failed to provide enough evidence to 
demonstrate commonality.   
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members in all regions and bank branches in a common way.  
Another significant problem with the proposed class in Dukes 
was that the statistical disparity was based on an average of 
national data that was not necessarily representative of 
regional or store disparities.  The Court explained that “a 
regional pay disparity … may be attributable to only a small 
set of Wal-Mart stores, and cannot by itself establish the 
uniform, store-by-store disparity upon which plaintiffs’ 
theory of commonality depends.”  Id. at 2555.   
 
 The proposed class in this case is also national, with 
153,000 plaintiffs who obtained loans at more than 1,400 
bank branches.  As in Dukes, the application of the 
Discretionary Pricing Policy may have resulted in a disparity 
in some regions or branches but not at all in others.  
Accordingly, a very significant disparity in one branch or 
region could skew the average, producing results that indicate 
a national disparity, when the problem may be more 
localized.  If the national disparity is not reflective of regional 
or even individual branch data, the putative class cannot show 
the policy affected each individual plaintiff in the same 
general fashion.   
 
 Plaintiffs contend that they controlled for regional 
differences in their regression analyses, but they must show 
that the putative class meets the commonality requirement by 
a preponderance of the evidence.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 
552 F.3d at 320.  They did not introduce their data, regression 
analyses, or any other evidence to support a finding of 
commonality.  Although Plaintiffs moved for class 
certification before the Supreme Court issued the Dukes 
opinion, the District Court requested the parties to submit 
briefs on class certification in light of the guidance given in 
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that decision, and still Plaintiffs did not give the District 
Court a factual foundation for a commonality finding in their 
favor.13
 
 
 Whether an appropriate foundation could be laid in a 
case like this is a question we leave for another day.14
                                              
13 Had the District Court found commonality to be 
present, it might have been guilty of simply accepting the 
parties’ assertions at face value, which we have explicitly 
stated is improper in a final Rule 23 determination.  In re 
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 300 (reversing the district 
court because it simply adopted “a party’s proposed findings” 
without exercising its own independent judgment). 
  We 
note, however, that, when faulting the Dukes plaintiffs for 
failing to account for regional differences that could 
undermine their claim of commonality, the Supreme Court 
went on to say: “There is another, more fundamental, respect 
in which respondents’ statistical proof fails.  Even if it 
established (as it does not) a pay or promotion pattern that 
differs from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in 
all of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores, that would still not 
demonstrate that commonality of issue exists.”  Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2555.  The Court then explained why, emphasizing that, 
as we have already noted, Watson requires that “the plaintiff 
must begin by indentifying the specific employment practice 
14 We likewise do not attempt to sort out here how the 
issues discussed in Dukes may play out differently, if at all, in 
a disparate treatment case as opposed to a disparate impact 
case.  As previously noted, see supra note 9, we are dealing 
here solely with the claim as the plaintiffs have chosen to 
frame it. 
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that is challenged.” Id. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).  “Other than 
the bare existence of delegated discretion,” the Court 
observed, “respondents have identified no ‘specific 
employment practice’ – much less one that ties all their 1.5 
million claims together.  Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s 
policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based 
disparity does not suffice.”  Id. at 2555-56. 
 
Here, as in Dukes, the exercise of broad discretion by 
an untold number of unique decision-makers in the making of 
thousands upon thousands of individual decisions undermines 
the attempt to claim, on the basis of statistics alone, that the 
decisions are bound together by a common discriminatory 
mode.15
                                              
15 That is not to say that statistics could never be a 
viable element of proof of commonality in a disparate impact 
case.  Indeed, several post-Dukes cases have relied on 
statistical analyses in their commonality determinations.  
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 166-68 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying in part on statistical evidence that 
demonstrated racial disparities in the implementation of New 
York’s “stop and frisk” policy); Morrow v. Washington, 277 
F.R.D. 172, 193 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (concluding that “statistical 
evidence that the number of racial and ethnic minorities 
stopped in and around [the city] increased dramatically when 
the [challenged program] was implemented” helped 
demonstrate that the city’s program “operates as a ‘general 
policy of discrimination’”).     
  Plaintiffs therefore have not met their burden of 
demonstrating that the “defendant’s conduct was common as 
to all of the class members,” Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 299, and 
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thus the District Court was correct to conclude that they do 
not share a common question of law or fact.16
 
           
IV. Conclusion  
 
Because the putative class lacks commonality, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 
Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of the settlement and 
certification of the settlement class.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the Court’s order.   
                                              
16 That conclusion is not, as Plaintiffs imply, the death 
knell for all disparate impact class actions.  When a 
challenged policy affects class members in roughly the same 
manner, that class can likely establish commonality.  In fact, 
Mt. Holly Garden’s Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Township of 
Mt. Holly, a case that Plaintiffs claim is effectively overruled 
by the District Court’s reading of Dukes, provides an example 
of a disparate impact case that could survive the commonality 
inquiry.  658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011).  In that case, African-
American and Hispanic residents of a low-income 
neighborhood brought a lawsuit contending that the city’s 
proposed redevelopment plan had produced a disparate 
discriminatory impact.  Id. at 377-81.  The contested policy in 
that case is readily apparent, and it was applied to each 
resident in a common manner.  Id.  The Mt. Holly plaintiffs 
therefore shared a common question, and, although they 
chose not to bring their claims as a class action, Dukes would 
fully support a finding of commonality in cases like theirs.   
